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This book is based on four visits to Libya in the years since 1969 
when the Revolutionary Command Council under Colonel 
Mu'ammar Gadafi came to power, and a country previously un- 
known and obscure thrust itself on world attention. 
I have concentrated on the period since 1969, on revolution- 
or coup? - on oil and on arab unity, for these are the themes of 
the new regime. The pre-revolution chapters are brief and selec- 
tive, for they are intended to emphasize those issues which bear 
most directly on the causes of the change in the country's politi- 
cal system, and the direction the country has taken since the 
toppling of the monarchy. There is some fairly considerable 
material on economics, because the politics of Libya get extensive 
if often superficial coverage, but the economics of this oil-rich 
rentier state are far less well understood. 
Scholars may shudder at my rendering of Arabic names, but 
I have used a transliteration most easily recognizable to non- 
Arabic readers; it is inconsistent here and there, as when there 
are quotations from sources using a different form. 
My indebtedness to sources and to informants will show in the 
foomotes and references. There are Libyans to whom I am deep- 
ly indebted, not necessarily because they agreed with me or I 
with them, but because they talked about their country and their 
problems in ways which helped meo understand them. Official 
Libya, though it gave me generous assistance, was apprehensive: 
'What  will you write?' they asked. 'We have had so many bad 
experiences.' Some may think the criticism in this book springs 
from malice and arrogance of the kind they have come to take for 
granted from 'foreigners'. I can only say that I tried to under- 
stand Libya in its own context, not Europe's, and that I tried to 
measure its  achievements against  the  need  for  revolutionary 
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change in Africa  and the Middle East, which is the cause Libya 
so vocally espouses. 
 
Note 
The Libyan  pound   was re-named the  Libyan  dinar  in  1969. 
There was no change of value. Numerous devaluations of inter- 
national  currencies   have  enhanced the  value  of  the  Libyan  
1
, 
dinar (£L). ,-4 
Until  November  1967 when the pound  sterling ws devalued, 
the Libyan  pound  was equivalent. Thereafter the Libyan pound 
was  equivalent  to  £t·J4. Parity   was  maintained  against  the 
dollar, with  the Libyan pound  equivalent to US  $2·8 until  the 
dollar  was devalued in 1972. The Libyan  pound/dinar equiva- 
lents  have moved as follows : 
 
US dollar   pound sterling 
1951  z·8 1·0 
1967  z·8 1·14 
1972 3'04 1•20 
1974  3'36  1"40 
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A Perverse  Revolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At first sight - as at last - there is no revolution  more contradic- 
tory and perverse than the Libyan.  It enjoys the vast wealth of 
the  oil-producing states in  the  Middle  East,  yet is determined 
nt to  be another Kuwait  or Saudi  Arabia.  It claims  a social 
revolution  that  will bring  Libya  into the  company  of the great 
twentieth-century revolutions for social liberation, yet it zealous- 
ly pursues a revival of Islamic fundamentalism. It was a rebellion 
of young army men against  the monarchical  head of a religious 
order, yet the cast of its own .political thinking is not secular  but 
religious. It is a regime under  which power is vested in eleven 
young  soldiers,  yet  it  boasts  of having  shepherded a  popular 
revolution  more mass-based  than even China's. It has promoted a  
cultural   revoiution   against   bureaucracy   and  called  on  the 
popular masses to rise to their historic  role, yet it suffocates any 
political action  or thought not  initiated  by the state. It reviles 
the  ancien  regime  for  the  corruption of the  privileged  classes 
that grew in the shadow of oil, and sees Libya today as a society 
without  classes or  social distinction, in  which  any  tendencies 
towards inequality will be combated  by a return  to the true ethic 
of  Islam.  Yet even  in  rejecting  the  concept  of class and  class 
struggle  as alien  to Arab or  Libyan  socialism, it  confronts  the 
monopoly  bastions  of the capitalist  world, the  oil cartels. It is 
dedicated  to· pan-Arabism, yet  has  prompted the  resentment, 
even the enmity, of Arab  states, from the conservative  shaikh- 
doms  to  the  radicals,  which  it  has  reviled  for  their  disparate 
approach  to Arab unity. It buys Mirages froFrance for use in 
the 'national battle' for the liberation  of Palestine, yet its leader 
Colonel  Gadafi  explains  setbacl{S in  this  struggle  and  future 
tactics by passages in the  Koran. Undaunted by the failure of 
previous attempts at unity  between Arab states, it is seeking to 
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hector a combined state of Libya  and  Egypt  to its feet, despite 
the seemingly insuperable problems  of federating two countries 
of such diverse domestic cast and such contradictory diplomatic 
postures  on  the  very issue  supposed to  weld  their  unity,  the 
battle for Palestine. 
Libya boasts a tiny population of under two million, so remote 
from the Middle East battlelines as to offer only a marginal con- 
tribution; yet she pursues a recklessly activist policy from Malta 
to  Ulster,  from  Uganda  to  Ethiopia   and   the  Yemen.  When 
Britain  connived  at  the  handing   over  to  Iran   of  two  small 
islands  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  Libya  promptly nationalized   the 
local  holdings   of  British   Petroleum, Britain's  principal   oil 
interest  there, as a reprisal. She  has intervened in  the  internal 
politics of  both  Uganda  and  the  Sudan, flying  plane-loads  of 
troops and arms into Uganda on the strength of General  Amin's 
false representation of an invasion; and  masterminding the 
forcing down of a plane carrying Sudanese revolutionaries, and a 
Libyan-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan  to mount a counter- 
revolution.  Some of her foreign  policy initiatives have been on 
the strength of provocative miscalculations: the fulsome welcome 
to the  army  coupmakers  in  Morocco was broadcast  round  the 
world even as the  coup  against  the  King  was failing. She  has 
attacked enemies and allies with equal sense of righteousness, 
clearly disconcerting her closest partners as much  as her antag- 
onists. Thus, though  combined  with  Egypt  and  Syria in a 
Federation, she has publicly pilloried  their governments for be- 
traying the fedayin cause. Ignoring the judgement of friends and 
the strengths of the enemy, Libya  has courted a policy of 
confrontation with Israel  which, taking into account the objec- 
tive strengths  and  weaknesses of the  two sides, is in  danger  of 
substituting rhetoric for purpose. .J 
By any rational  political analysis, the contradictions and mis- 
judgements  of the  Libyan  revolution  should  have  brought  its 
sallies grindiug to a halt; yet its journeys into pan-Arabism and 
abroad  on  the African continent continue to show a surprising 
endurance.  Gadafi's   simplistic   formula   for   a  united  Arab, 
African, Asian, and Latin American world, together with the 
reformed  young  in  advanced  capitalist  society, is  based  pre- 
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dominantly on a return to religion and refuses to take into account 
the wide range of other factors relevant to the debate and  to the 
search within these continents  for a new ideology and economic 
system. Yet in an  Arab and  African  world demoralized  by the 
failure of Third World initiatives, discouraged by the attempts at 
non-alignment which brought  their  countries  not extra leverage 
but increased isolation from the world's  power centres, Gadafi's 
speeches are capable of prompting unexpected attention. True, 
his solutions are absurdly simple -· unity, morality, faith,' deter- 
mination  - but   perhaps   other   leaderships  have  grown   too 
corrupt, obtuse, and sophisticated? There were even students at 
Paris's  rebellious  university  of Vincennes  who hailed Gadafi as 
the only Third World leader with any real stomach for struggle. 
His speeches run over with smooth fanaticism yet he is capable 
of  speaking  painful and  unpalatable truths. Arab  regimes  are 
rotten; Arab states  have betrayed  the  Palestinian  cause.  Arab 
unity  is hollow. Arab summit meetings  are a waste of time. If 
you want something  to die, he has said, send it to be buried  in 
Arab League files in the skyscraper in Cairo. 
There is something riveting  about  the audacity  of his indict- 
ment  and the simplicity  of his solutions. In Cairo intellectuals 
who read his interviews  in Le Monde and  his speeches in  their 
own newspapers  bury  their  heads :in their  hands at his nai'vete. 
In the  Maghreb   cities,  Arab  but  also  permeated  by  French 
culture, Gadafi has been seen as a latter-day Asterix absorbed in 
his  picaresque  adventures, and  cut  off from  history  and  the 
world. What is it about Libya and Gadafi in the seventies which 
explains their eccentricities  - this blinding gap  between Libyan 
interpretation and  Arab and  world!. reality?  Most  observers are 
filled with scepticism; yet among  some  there  remains  the hope 
that in his impetuous innocence  he will stumble  upon some way 
to  break  the impasse  in  the  Arab  world.  Is it  to  be a case of 
pristine Bedouin morality,steeped in the fundamentalist morality 
of  the  seventh  century, riding  in from  the  desert  to  reform 
twentieth-century statecraft? Is this possible in our day.and age? 
For Libya's young army government is pronouncing prescrip- 
tions for the Arab world already considered unworkable and out- 
worn. There is an eerie sense of contemporary problems  given 
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previous solutions; of newcomers rushing in where more 
experienced  partisans  have learned  not to tread; of policies 
discovered for the first time in a region where they have already 
run  their  course. It is surely  this  which  accounts  for  the most 
predominant  characteristic of  the  young  Libyan   regime: its 
sense of compelling  anachronism, its appearance  of being 
strangely  displaced from  its time. 
 
Much  of the explanation  for this phenomenon must be found 
in the bombardment of Libya and Libyans  by the forces of out- 
side  history.  After  Liberia  and  Ethiopia, she  was  the  third 
independent state of Africa. But it was an arrested independence, 
Western-conducted and  controlled. Libya  came into  her Arab 
own only  in 1969, when the Western-supported monarchy  was 
unseated.  And this makes Libya  nominy one of the first, but 
virtually  the last, independent state  of Africa, not counting the 
unliberated south. By the  time  she  felt  the  first  full  flush  of 
modern  nationalism  in state form, Egypt had already kliown the 
sensation  for  the  better  part  of half a century.  Libya  was the 
newest Arab state; she emerged  as the critic of the oldest Arab 
states which had been created in the aftermath not of the Second 
but  of the  First World  War.  No  wonder  the experiences  that 
she found so daring were regarded  as dated in other  parts of the 
Middle  East.  But  Libya's development had  been  retarded  by 
both her history and her geography, which had in turn deformed 
her political experience. In the first half of the twentieth century 
she experienced  rule by the Ottoman empire; then came foreign 
invasion and  conquest, after  a prolonged  but savagely defeated 
armed  popular  resistance. The colonialism  which followed  was 
founded  on metropolitan peasant settlement in an exclusive en- 
clave  economy.  This  was  ended   by  war  between   European 
powers, some of whose most  ferocious  battles  were fought  on 
Libyan soil. It was followed by both the British and the French 
varieties  of  military  ancolonial caretal<er occupation.  When 
independence came in 1951,it  was in response not to the internal 
thrust   of  Libyan  actions  but   because  it  suited   the  strategic 
purpose  of the West. 
Less than two decades separated resistance and independence, 
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but they could not have been more disturbing in their discon- 
tinuity. At one moment in time men were in insurrection against 
authority; at the next they were haphazardly co-opted into it. 
For the better part of thirty years in parts of Libya, if not the 
entire country, there bad been two perilous options: to persist in 
what Berque bas called a state of armed refusal, or to compro- 
mise and through expediency risk corruption by the alien regime 
in  power. The anti-colonial war bad prompted  very different 
reactions from Bedouin* tribesmen and townsmen; from tribes 
that had allowed themselves to be drawn into the political orbit 
of the colonial administration; others that bad remained aloof 
but passive; and still others that bad resisted bodily to the end; 
between Cyrenaica where guerrilla bands, however reduced in 
size and striking  power, fought  until 1932, and  Tripolitania, 
where active resistance ended before the twenties. Between the 
last episodes of the resistance and the end of Italian colonization, 
there was a span of not much more than ten years, but the stand 
that men had taken, of intransigence or compromise, suddenly 
became irrelevant. In Algeria, those who had fought the French 
army for eight years battled their way into control of the com- 
manding heights of the revolutionary regime, and military and 
political gains were made one. In the parts of Libya where the 
resistance had been more prolonged if sporadic, it was also more 
dispersed and therefore localized; while the phase of primary 
tribal and religious resistance bad not been followed by political 
opposition of the more modern type or the growth of a consistent 
nationalist ideology and movement which would in time inherit 
independence. In the rest of the Maghreb armed resistance was 
ended, but  a tumultuous  movement  of  strikes and  demons- 
trations grew in its place; the masses began to take over political 
action from the tribes.1 In  Libya  this did  not happen in the 
same way. The  country and a subdued population passed pre- 
cipitately from colonization to independence, with sovereignty 
installed  by the  results of international  and  United  Nations 
diplomacy. Thus  even the coming of independence played its 
part in shattering what sense of historical and political continuity 
Libyans had managed to retain, and even the most favourable 
* Bedouin from badw in Arabic, meaning  nomad. 
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tum of  events  played  havoc  with  the  moral  and  ethical issues 
which preoccupy men in times of social and political disturbance. 
By 1951 Libya had political sovereignty  but little else beside. 
She was perhaps  the poorest  country in the world. The  battles 
of the  Second  World  War  had  devastated  what  infrastructure 
had  been  built  and  disrupted the  economic  life  of  even  the 
Bedouin communities. Italian colonization did not seek to mould 
an elite, so that  there  had  been  virtually  no  education  system 
capable  of  preparing men  for  government and  administrative 
service. Obscure and illiterate men were plucked from their 
communities  to  occupy  office.  For  a  decade  Libya  was kept 
barely alive by American and British aid. The country  lived on 
charity and felt the humiliation of poverty. Suddenly in 1959 oil 
was discovered; by 1961  crude  was  being  produced and  ex- 
-ported; and  oil revenues  began to course through the economy 
on a staggering  scale from 1963 onwards.  Once feeble and un- 
noticed, this was a country  now not only financially self-reliant 
but wealthy enough to influence others. Independe.nce had been 
unexpected, without prior indication let alone preparation for its 
coming.  Oil  was  even  more  precipitate. It  came  despite  the 
efforts of Libyans and yet transformed their  lives. Humble men 
could  suddenly   become  not  only  ministers   but  millionaires. 
(Most  Libyans   can  cite  you  the  case of  the  clerk  under  the 
British  military  administration who became  both;  or the  baker 
from  the Fezzan  oasis who today lives in a Swiss chateau  with 
his personal masseur;) 
The accidents of history and  geography  which bestowed first 
an  unexpected   independence  but  even  more  importantly oil 
wealth, and the resulting collision of several periods of history- 
that  of ·a  bare  subsistence  society  with  a  vengeful  colonizing 
metropolis and then with the giant oil multi-nationals-have had 
a bewildering  impact  on Libyan social life and  consciousness. 
Wealth  so effortlessly acquired, solutions  which so haphazardly 
present  themselves, have helped to  pread an illusion  that con- 
verges only too easily with  the use of Islam by Libya's  regime. 
Opportunity has come in bursts· from some external causation; 
faith,   trust, and   morality   will  surely   produce   solutions, for 
rationality   and   planning   have  indeed   had  little   to  do  with 
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Libya's  economic  bonanzas. If baraka (blessing)  is the  reason, 
then  this is beyond the effort of man. A by-product of blinding 
faith is a t ust in recklessness ; for if the twists in Libyan oppor- 
tunity   have  been  so  unpredictable, and  results  have  been  so 
unaffected by effort, why not hazard more daring.claims still and 
trust  once again  to  belief?  It is the  sort  of all-embracing faith 
which prompts  the Libyan  reply to the oil companies: 'We have 
lived s,ooo years without  oil money; we can do it again.' It is as 
much  philosophy  as bargaining  counter. It  is  this  same  hap- 
hazard experience of an imposed  history that makes the timeless- 
ness of the  Koran  seem stm  more appropriate. To a Bedouin 
society  thrust   into  the  oil  technology  age,  the.re  seems  little 
strange  about  applying the precepts  of seventh  century  Arabia 
to modern  issues. Economic  change  has  been imposed  on  the 
society   from   outside.   Where   most   skilled   manpower   and 
virtually  all expertise  is imported, local society can absorb  the 
benefits of the oil economy without  having  to change greatly in 
itself. 
Having  been plucked out of their history, Libyans  are finding 
it  a  painful  experience   to  return to  it.  Even  when,  in  pre- 
European-conquest  times,  political   association   was  achieved 
between its three spreading provinces, geography  and  parochial 
politics   and   economies   made   effectively   close   association 
difficult. Tripolitania's move towards  unity with ·cyrenaica had 
died  out in ·the  twenties; the independence Constitution of the 
fifties conferred national sovereignty but more ffective power on 
the parts  than  on the centre; it was only the exigencies of the 
oil economy which  achieved  a constitutionally unified   state. 
The  army  revolution of 1969 claimed to  restore   Libyans to 
their  true  identity and  destiny; to make the final meaningful 
break  with  the  colonial   and   pro-Western past.   But  Gadafi, 
like all fervent Arab  nationalists, conceives  of the Arab world 
as  a  single  homogeneous whole  and  of  the Arab  people as a 
single nation  bound  by the  common  ties of language, religion, 
and  history: even though  the  Arab  world  has  not  constituted 
a  single  political  entity  since Islam's  expansion into an empire 
during the  seventh   and   e.ighth  centuries. It is   a  strain   of 
nationalist  fervour  that ignores the diversity and  differentiation 
 
17 
A Perverse Revolution 
 
in the  Arab  world; for  Islam  is expected to supply  the  in- 
dissoluble  core  of  identity   and  communal  heritage. Gadafi 
thus rejects  a  micro-nationalism,  whether of  the  Libyan  or 
any other strain. Libyans have been told that they are genuinely 
Libyan for the first time in  their history. At  the same time a 
people always overwhelmed by outsiders with superior skills is 
told that it is Arab above all. It is a  bewildering experience to 
have simultaneously to absorb an immediate and  a  wider 
identity. The  union with Egypt could not  pose  this  question 
in a more direct and urgent form. 
 
Yet it is. precisely this retur!l to the Arab world that is the 
pulse of the Libyan army revolution. For as the occupation of 
Suez and Farouk's enforced submission to Britain was the 
humiliation that  gave Egypt to  Nasser, so the  occupation of 
Sinai by Israel after the Six Day War was the catalyst of the 
Libyan young officers' coup.The foreign policy of the monarchy 
had positioned Libya not towards Egypt and the Middle East 
but towards the West. The struggle to breal< free was thus the 
struggle to break into the Middle East and to become part of 
Arab aspirations. This is one reason why Libya, remote from 
the battlefields of the Middle East, insists on trying to settle the 
terms of the battle. Her late realization of her own identity is, 
for her, inseparable from the displacement of the Palestinians. 
For an Arab world plunged toto despair after the 1967 defeat, 
the Libyan coup -and the Sudanese, led by Nimeiry six months 
earlier- were signs of a possible revival in Arab fortunes. It was 
Al  Ahram's  Heykal, sent to Libya to conduct the first on-the- 
spot investigation for Nasser, who pronounced the Libyan coup- 
makers as a young generation of a distinct  quality.  They were 
the post-setback generation, the new hope of the Arab world. 
Perhaps Egypt's revolution of 1952, which had so changed the i' 
face of the Middle East, would have a new beginning in Libya's • 
Nasserite generation? For there was no question but that these 
were fervent young Nasserites, determined that the army would . 
not only make the revolution but continue to lead it for its own 
good, and  that  it  was the  army-backed  State  which  would 
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initiate whatever political organization and ideology were judged 
suitable. 
This is not only an essential theory for an army-led  regime; it 
happens  to  coincide  with  the  Libyan  reality.  For  one  of the 
consequences  of Libya's  disturbed contemporary experience  is 
that indigenous political groupings, when they were able to form 
after the colonial conquest, were tiny, short-lived,and uncertain. 
Political party organization  was banned  by the monarchy in the 
first year of independence. The  middle class, which informs the 
dominant politics of the more characteristic Middle  East state, 
failed  to  gain  any  real  political  footing  in  Libya.  This  was 
largely  because when money arrived, with  the  pumping  of oil, 
to produce a small group of middlemen contractors, transporters, 
and  property  speculators,  they  thrived  on  patronage from  un- 
bounded resources, and politics as a means to economic acquisi- 
tion was unnecessary.In the early sixties, small Arab Nationalist, 
Baathist, and  Marxist  groups  appeared; but  they never  really 
took indigenous root;and, because they were imports,  they pro- 
duced not any application of their policies to Libyan conditions, 
but  the factional disputes  which riddled  their  parent  bodies in 
the Middle  East and played such havoc with early attempts  at 
pan-Arab strategies. Gadafi's standing indictment of the civilians 
of his generation  anq  earlier  ones was that  they had  been in- 
effective in opposition  under  the monarchy. They  had failed to 
make  the  revolution.  From  this  grew  a  sharp  distaste  for all 
voluntarist  initiative  and action. All 'factional' politics and all 
ideology  other  than  the  one  produced  by  the  state,  whether 
Moslem Brother,Baathist, Marxist,or unlabelled, were declared 
illegal. Nasserite  Egypt  had  arrived  at  the  same  point  from a 
somewhat  different  national  experience. 
To  Libya's  strict  adherence  to these  tenets  of the  Nasserite 
model,  one  must  add  Gadafi's  own  peculiar  contribution of 
Islam as religion  but  also as politics. While  few, if any, other 
than Beshir Hawady, among his army Revolutionary Command 
Council share his fanatical religious zeal, the cast and the content 
of their socialist persuasion is religious, not secular. Setbacks to 
the Arab cause are attributable, essentially, to human frailty and 
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corruptibility, to the failure of true  belief and a departure from 
the moral precepts  of Islam. It makes for a dedicated  but once 
again  a fatalistic  view of  the  world,  for  it  reduces  social and 
political  action  to  the  level  of spiritual commitment, and  the 
pursuit  of policy to a moral crusade. 
 
There is no denyiqg the special cast given the Libyan  revolu- 
tion by the idiosyncratic character of Mu'ammar Gadafi. Much 
is impossible  to  understand without  understanding him.  The 
stories about  his brushes with other  Arab leaders, his intemper- 
ate outbursts, are legion. Some  have even  tried  to explain  the 
wild inconsistencies  of his  policies by the  theory  that  he is an 
agent  for a regime  other  than  his own; I have even heard  the 
notion  that  he is the most efficient agent provocateur  that Israel 
or the  United States could  recruit.  The objective  consequence 
of some  of his  acts  could  very  well spread  despondency and 
defeat on his own side and satisfaction  on the enemy's. But this 
is to reflect not on the man and his motivation,  but on the play 
of forces in the world in     epoch when every weakness, division, 
error, and obfuscation among dependent peoples produces 
corresponding strengths for imperialism. 
The obsession with the leader, even when it is the inimitable 
Gadafi, is precisely what should  be avoided, for the sake of any 
real perspective. For to explain Libya by the temperament, 
eccentricity, even instability, of Gadafi is to make no meaningful 
explanation  in  terms of history  and  Libyan  society. There is a 
rich and fertile  source to be tapped  in the study  of personality. 
But  while this  might  help in explaining Gadafi, what  explains 
the Libyan response to him? For all the innovations of policy he 
has   introduced,  there  is   a  long   continuity  between   Libya 
before 1969 and  after.  Religion  has always been  an important 
part  of the  search  for  identity and  expression.  After  all, Italy            l: 
colonized  for Christendom as well as for  Sicilian  settlers, and           .· 
the resistance wars were fought in the interests  of the true faith 
as part of national emancipation. Embryonic nationalist  political 
expression   has  always  been   dominated  and   subdued  by   a 
political-religious  state  structure. If Gadafi's   activism   takes 
away  the  breath  of Libyans accustomed  to  being  despised  or 
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ignored, they are elated by his sheer bravado. He leaves circles 
of principally urban  opinion as unconvinced in Benghazi and 
Tripoli as in Cairo and Damascus, but these circles are smaller 
in  Libya  than  anywhere  else; and  his  pronouncements  un- 
doubtedly fall on a receptive interior, and find an answering 
chord  in  the  large constituency  of  the  newly urbanized still 
struggling to integrate in a modern economy and a wider world. 
The  popular interpretation of Gadafi is a leader flushed with 
insatiable ambition to govern not only Libya but far beyond it; 
to establish himself as the new Nasser. It seems important to 
distinguish between a  personal ambition  to rule and  Gadafi's 
conviction that he is more loyal to Nasser's mission than any 
other Arab leader of his time. He is gripped by a vision of the 
need to develop his country, transform the society, rediscover 
the true Islam, regenerate the Arab world, and unite it, and fire 
his generation with the same compulsions. How better to do this 
than by the continual example of the leader? Gadafi has himself 
shown insight into the personalization of Libyan - or Egyptian, 
or Arab -politics round the figure of the leader. The September 
1969 revolution, he has said, represents principles, values, and 
ideals. It was trying to make the people sing the praise of facts, 
not persons, but such talk was considered strange in the Arab 
homeland. 'Nasser tried hard to make the masses from the Gulf 
to the Ocean, masses who had no faith in theiabilities at the 
time, believe in themselves and shoulder their responsibilities. 
But the harder he tried to make them believe in themselves, the 
more they clung to his person.' Gadafi's  resignation gestures, 
repeated at moments of frustration arising from the failure of the 
Libyan people to respond to the challenge, are attempts to break 
out of this style of personalized politics. Yet in the end Gadafi, 
like Nasser, perhaps.despite himself but inevitably because of his 
methods and outlook, will encourage a popular belief in his in 
fallibility. Will he, too, leave demoralization in his wake? 
Not that he has not learned and changed. He continues the 
same bold forays iJCltO  Arab policy. But the naivete of the early 
attempts has been tempered by setbacks. Once at the first sound 
of a crisis, he climbed into his plane and flew from capital to 
capital urging immediate top-level summitry. These days he is 
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disillusioned  with summits. Once  he composed  a plan  for  the 
battle to regain Palestine; totalling the Arab armouries as though 
the arithmetic would provide  the strategy. More  recently, when 
the fedayin were under  fire in Lebanon, he announced his offer 
of aid but told the Palestinian organizations that they themselves 
had to decide how best to deploy it. Recent speeches have shown a 
sophistication quite absent  from earlier  attempts, but also an 
underlying thread  of desperation at the enormity  of the  prob- 
lems.• Like you,'he told a Libyan  popular conference, • I became 
independent on  I September after  400 to soo  years of foreign 
rule ... You go to Algeria, Egypt,  Feisal, Kuwait, and  Jordan. 
I have met all these people. By God thoughts are confused. I no 
longer know the truth in the Arab world. Why? Because every- 
one  gives you  his own  opinion  . .. By God  I am confused.  I 
cannot tell any more who is right.'    ' 
Yet  the  admission  was not  the  start  of some  strengthening 
insight, but only a temporary  lapse, for his characteristic style of 
government  has continued uninterrupted:  the  same  cloistered 
proceedings  of the Revolutionary Command Council; the pre- 
cipitate edict without  reference to precedent and without consul- 
tation; the  word  of the speech  becoming  the  letter  of the  law 
virtually overnight. (The • cultural revolution'against the passive 
and   bureaucratic and  the  agents  of  'foreign' ideologies  was 
announced on 16 April 1973; within  days there  were extensive 
round-ups of Libyans whose mistaken ideas were to be cured by 
a spell  behind  bars.)  It is government by demagogy. Libyans 
agonized  by the  wilfulness  of some  decisions  have cursed  the 
mass media  which give the spoken  or written word instant 
universality and authority. 
And yet Gadafi has infinite patience - and appetite - for pro- 
longed  public  sessions  when  he  invites  the  public,  however 
select, to confront  him. Though these public sessions are lughly 
attractive, even exciting,  as a form  of popular  or  Bedouin 
democracy,  they  can  be  no  substitution for  institutionalized 
forms of patticipatory government. These forms will continue to 
elude a regime led  by a closed army  group  with an ideology of 
army-guided government. For,  however  many  committees  are 
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instigated from the top, there  remains inertia and passivity at 
the bottom. 
It is  during  these  popular  sessions, generally televised for 
successive days, that Brother Colonel Gadafi can be seen at his 
most magnetic, tireless, and obdurate. From him comes an in- 
exhaustible flow; didactic, at times incoherent; peppered with 
snatches of half-formed opinions, cryptic self-spun philosophy, 
inaccurate  or  partial  information;  admonitions;  confidences; 
some sound common sense, and as much prejudice. Few of his 
speeches  d.o not contain the germ of at least one sound idea - but 
often only the germ of the idea,and little of its real development. 
For ·Gadafi's  view of the world is uncomplicated  by any real 
knowledge of it. 
One of the problems in understanding contemporary Libya is 
to reconcile the significant and the seemingly absurd which flow 
from the use of fundamentalist religion to make a social revolu- 
tion. On women: 'You  (in the West) force women to work in 
factories. This  is oppression of  women·. In  Islam  we do not 
sacrifice women for material gain.You have initiated the abortion 
of pregnant women, you have dispersed the family and broken 
up society. We have no problems whatsoever. You simply have 
to apply  the  Koran  for  ideal social living.'  On  the  cultural 
revolution in People's China and Libya: 'In China the cultural 
revolution was led by the Red Army; in Libya it is the masses 
that lead. China is searching for an identity, for new principles 
to be inculcated in the minds of the people; we are consolidating 
something already in our  minds. We need to go back to our 
origins.' On Sartre and existentialism:'Sartre is a lost man. We 
have the answers to all the questions he puts. Why study these 
issues of existence since they are in the Koran? Only he who has 
no holy book can ask such questions.'2 But the use of religion as 
resistance is nothing new. On the one hand foreign conquest has 
met with naked revolt. This is Jacques Berque's Islam as Revo- 
lution.3 On the other hand,as superior invading forces prevailed, 
there has been the use of Islam as Refuge, a retreat  but one 
which  derived  nonetheless  from  the  same  basic attitude  of 
refusal. This refusal 'took refuge in a side of life that formed its. 
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surest repository, namely religion'. Islam in North Africa  with- 
drew into  the' 'fatal retreat  of the  zawiya of popular  mysticism 
and xenophobic piety'. In the Maghreb maraboutism and saintly 
. brotherhoods  retained   their   vitality   until   the   thirties:  'For 
believers [they] raised a rampart against the advance of en- 
lightenment, still identified with that of the foreigner.'4 Believing 
that  all the  guidance  a man  needs in  running a state  is to  be 
found exclusively in the Koran, Gadafi has an essentially religious 
view of foreign exploitation. His distaste for urban life - because 
cities,if not creations of tb,e West, are imitations of its culture -is 
. synonymous  with his view of corruption. His indictment of the 
values imposed  by the  money  market  - magazine  pictures  of 
women,  the disturbing influences  on young  men who study  in 
Europe  and  the United States  - are characteristic of the xeno- 
phobic  piety  of  those  who  needed  to  use  Islam  as  resistance 
against foreign  conquest.  How closely the great majority  of his 
people can approximate to the life-style and goals of their leader 
zealot is at issue, for his view of true  religion as martyrdom for 
the cause could well be disturbingly alien to the petit-bourgeois 
yearnings of young Libyans  flourishing  under  an oil economy. 
Libya is a difficult country  to know, let alone analyse. Central  I 
I 
to the  process of social change  and  the  ideological  ferment  of 
Arab cities since the end of the Second World War has been the 
rise of an urban  proletariat  and the transformation of the status             
I 
of women. In  Libya  the position  of women is changing  in only 
barely perceptible  fashion. Except  for the girls in school class- rooms 
and the sprinkling  at the university,  the society is totally segregated. 
Half the society is accessible only in the home and  '! 
then  only to other  women or the closest of masculine kin. The    I 
family  is closed,  private, and  conservative.  In the  streets  and 
public life, women are either  not physically present or shrink 
anonymously   behind   the  voluminous  baracan  which  exposes 
only enough of one eye for the wearer to see where to walk. 
If internal  conservatism  has stopped  the emancipation of 
women,outside forces in the shape of oil have had profound and 
yet limited effects on the economy and on social formation.  The 
oil  industry  does  not  bring  the  kind  of industrialization that 
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releases an urban  working class of any size, for it runs on a tiny 
labour  force that is in part imported. So  the towns are swollen, 
but  the   urban   population  consists  of  a  few  first-generation 
workers, pedlars,  and  small shopkeepers, innumerable govern- 
ment employees, and a thin layer of the new rich. It is a society 
of social gaps, an unformed  society even by the standards of 
underdeveloped economies, or one fon)Jing only very slowly. 
Male  society,  which  is  interchangeable  with  civic  life,  is 
blocked out not into large easily recognizable and well-organized 
groupings- formal political parties have hardly eve.r existed-but 
into innumerable coteries, sometimes as peer groups of school or 
army  class-mates, family or village or work associates, football 
clubs or circles of friends  whose association may endure  beyond 
friendship into  some  more  durable  relationship. Not  here the 
seething  political  parties  and  working-class  movement  of the 
cities of the Maghreb and the Middle East. And in the country- 
side low population  density and  the absence of a viable agricul- 
- rural  economy  combine  to create  a similar  void in social and 
political organization. 
Jacques  Be.rque has remarked  on  the backwardness  of socio- 
logical analysis in the Arab world, on the absence of analysis, the 
irregularity of reactions  towards social phenomena, the scarcity 
of objective documentation.5 Liberation from the past is making 
this, if anything, more and not less difficult in Libya. Historians, 
for instance, have been discouraged from studying the sources of 
support and  weakness of the Sanusi  regime and  period, for all 
remnants of the old regime must be·obliterated in the interests of 
the new. Where politics does not block enquiry, convention and 
Gadafi's insistence on unswerving  adherence  to the letter  of the 
Koran  invariably  do. 
There is insistence on the unchanging dogma of Islam. This, 
among  other  aspects,  recognizes  no  distinction  between  the 
spiritual and  the secular,-for Islam in history  did nor differenti- 
ate between religion and state. There is thus  the insistence  that 
Moslem  religious  precepts  form an integral  part  of the law of 
the stare; regardless of the nature  of the state. There is the role 
of orthodoxy  in supporting established authority and setting  up 
communal unity as the highest objective of social action.6 There 
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is the use of Islamic  education  less to instruct the child than to 
adapt  him  to  the  absolute,  for  'the Koran  is learnt  by hean 
with a superb disregard  of intelligibility'.7 
All  this  makes  Libya's an  inarticulate and  even  a  nervous 
revolution. Except for Gadafi, none of the coupmakers  has said 
anything  illuminating about   its  origins  and   meaning:   their 
speeches are poor paraphrases of Gadafi's. An intellectual  whom 
I tried  to engage in a general discussion  about  pre-coup Libya 
and  the  causes  behind  the  change  advised:  'When you  see 
Gadafi  you  can  ask  him  about  the  causes  of  the  revolution.' 
Civil servants- in a system  that is a mix of Italian Bourbonic, 
Egyptian  bureaucracy, and  the army-induced system  of closed 
hierarchical   decision-making - are  characteristically cautious; 
but doubly so under a regime in which no one except the 
Revolutionary Command   Council  feels  secure  enough  to  in- 
terpret policy on minor as much as on major issues. Those  who 
were politically committed  under the previous ,regime and were 
even persecuted for  their opposition are reluctant to speak out. 
This  regime has declared  all 'pany' politics  to be treacherous 
to the purposes of the army-led State and during 1973 it rounded 
up· and  imprisoned persons  suspected  of  political  views, lest 
civilians try to steal or distort  the revolution. 
Yet, within Libya, many alarmed at the record of other military 
regimes recognize in the Free Officers the group that alone found 
the  means  to  displace  the  monarchy: that  transformed   Libya 
from a rubber  stamp of Anglo-American policy into a state with 
an international identity  artd voice; and  that  squeezed  the  oil 
companies  in a masterful  series of negotiations  which  brought 
benefits not only to Libya but to all Middle East oil producers. 
For whatever the rational reservations, there have been changes 
in foreign policy, in oil policy, and in domestic policy. The issue 
is why  the  changes  have gone  so far and  no further; to what 
extent their limits are imposed  by the army regime and Gadafi's 
singular style;and how much is generic to the Libyan condition. 
For one must try to guard against a vision of Libya bounded  by  1 
the end of a European, or expatriate, or diplomatic  nose. Much 
speculation about  the  Arab  world -is dominated  by European 
preoccupations and  the interpretations of European diplomacy. 
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The attempt should be to treat Libya as an intelligible whole. For 
whether  or  not  Libya's example is relevant  to other  countries 
and systems,it has nonetheless to be understood and appreciated 
for having grown in its own climate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
....  
'J 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
